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ABSTRACT
When cynical distance and ironic posturing have become the
prevalent means of relating to public life, political humour is no
longer considered subversive. It has been argued that both in
Russia and the United States, ideology has co-opted satire,
meaning that citizens can consume outrage passively through
various satirical media products, thereby displacing outrage and
abstaining from more active forms of resistance. This articles
explores the twenty-ﬁrst century potential of irony and cynicism
to disrupt and subvert through parody, be it in the form of
political satire or ironic protest, examining how similar paradigms
are expressed across diﬀerent geographical contexts.
The ironic life is certainly a provisional answer to the problems of too much comfort, too
much history and too many choices – Wampole (2013)
It has been observed that in the twenty-ﬁrst century, political humour experiences difﬁcul-
ties gaining traction, as everyone appears to be in on the joke (Hitchens 2009), while the
Internet has made sure that no topic is off limits:
These days, every politician is a laughing-stock, and the laughter which occasionally used to
illuminate the dark corners of the political world with dazzling, unexpected shafts of hilarity
has become an unthinking reﬂex on our part, a tired Pavlovian reaction to situations that are
too diﬃcult or too depressing to think about clearly. (Coe 2013)
Along similar lines, Slavoj Žižek sees certain forms of irony as indicative of a stance of
‘cynical distance’, and notes that ‘what is really disturbing’ is the ‘underlying belief in
the liberating, anti-totalitarian force of laughter, of ironic distance’ (Žižek 1989: 24).
Žižek takes his cue from Sloterdijk’s description of the modern cynic and describes
cynical distance from ideology as mere illusion, and a belief in being able to maintain
such aloofness shows how successfully we have been coopted by ideology: ‘in contempor-
ary societies, democratic or totalitarian, that cynical distance, laughter, irony, are, so to
speak, part of the game. The ruling ideology is not to be taken seriously or literally’
(Žižek 1989: 24). While we may therefore cling to the idea that we have transcended
false consciousness, we are in fact being duped into thinking we are free of ideological
trappings merely because laughter is possible, or at times even encouraged.
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This discussion draws on the multiple layers of cynicism at work in contemporary
Russia, as well as their interrelation with US and other Western instantiations of irony.
The choice of the US and Russia as case studies is not accidental; each harbours modalities
of political humour in response to, or as symptoms of speciﬁc political climates. If parts of
American society are said to keep important questions at an ironic arm’s length, then in a
similar vein it is cynicism that has been treated as the ultimate Russian aﬄiction. And
while irony and cynicismmay be distinct phenomena, they occupy neighbouring positions
on the spectrum of ‘structures of feeling’. The following discussion does not aim to provide
a cultural history of either phenomenon, but looks at speciﬁc instantiations of the two, at
how irony and cynicism are not only interlinked but, also, how the former can be a form of
response to the latter. The aim is thus not so much to illustrate diﬀerences but, rather, to
show how paradigms are expressed in diﬀerent contexts. The convergence of the two con-
texts along certain fault lines will be thematically addressed throughout this discussion.
Satire or political humour are here treated as one expression of an ironic or cynical
stance to dominant political and societal formations. Indeed, it can be argued that this
form of expression is a form of political communication in itself (Purcell et al. 2010). Sep-
arate from the discussion focusing on these speciﬁc geopolitical locations, the article exam-
ines the twenty-ﬁrst century’s apparent failure to mobilise subjectivities in the name of
political or societal ideals that seek to achieve a wholesale transformation of society.
The notion of such a failure coexists with, or is contradicted by, the short-lived intensity
and global legacy of theOccupymovement – itself frequently employing humour in its acts
of protest (e.g., Yalçıntaş 2015). The eﬃcacy of ‘ironic protest’ will also be examined as it is
once more becoming a commonmodality in responding to political developments that seem
themselves to have co-opted satire, currently most visibly exempliﬁed by US President
Donald Trump’s relationship with the public. Ultimately, the two phenomena emerge not
as contradictions, but as responses by a generation that frequently sees political engagement
as inherently ﬂawed and traditional politics as corrupt while simultaneously facing the chal-
lenges of navigating the post-truth abundance of information circulating online.
The article analyses speciﬁc examples of satire, as well as the responses of cultural com-
mentators and academics to these manifestations of political humour. While the approach
adopted is frequently theoretical, the study draws on a number of cases in Russia, the United
States and beyond that utilitise political humour in their performances or public appear-
ances, as well as critical responses to them. An important question underpinning this
article is whether there are (recent) political climates that are more conducive to political
humour and satire and, more contentiously, eras during which these become more or less
eﬀective? After all, each dominant political regime produces forms of resistance, so can
the same be said of the converging modalities of power in Russia and the US, among
others? In order to investigate the claim that an ironic stance precludes serious engagement,
the ﬁrst part of this article will ask what an ironic or cynical relationship to public life entails,
examining how ‘living ironically’ can be a manifestation of cynical ideology.
Irony and cynicism in modern guises
In the US, the archetypal contemporary ironist is represented by the hipster – a denomi-
nation few ever see ﬁt to apply to themselves, and which is frequently treated as a kind of
subspecies of the millennial, itself a generation that has become the subject of numerous
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negative myths (Thompson 2013). While there seems to be less agreement on what con-
stitutes the essence or component parts from which hipsterdom is formed, it appears that
whatever activities they partake in, be it their choice of dress, music or other forms of
entertainment, hipsters do so through the prism of irony. The crux of the critique
addressed at such ironists is their denial of the meaningfulness of any endeavour, includ-
ing earnest participation in political life – a ‘commitment phobia’ to seriousness and the
responsibilities this would entail:
Everything they do is ironic: from the clothes they wear to the TV-shows they watch, to the
stupid facial hair they grow – it’s all an endless joke. There is no substance behind any of it.
Hipsters rebel against a shallow, materialistic, directionless society by being shallow, materi-
alistic and directionless. (Greif et al. 2010: 12)
Rather than constituting a rebellion, others have argued that irony functions as a defence
mechanism, becoming effective in its very slipperiness and through the self-awareness of
the ironist. In the words of literary scholar Christy Wampole, ‘To live ironically is to hide
in public’ (Wampole 2013). At the same time, Bjørn Schiermer argues that looking to hip-
sters as a vessel of change is an inherently futile venture, as they do not rally behind a cause
as much as they deﬁne themselves via the appreciation of certain cultural objects (Schier-
mer 2014). However, he insists that the charge of insincerity is perhaps misdirected, even if
this sincerity is mostly applied to cultural and material artefacts – indeed, behind a humor-
ous appropriation there often lies a celebration of authenticity. Crucially, according to
Schiermer, their less overtly political stance may also be connected to their privilege, as
‘hipsters are young, white and middle class, typically between 20 and 35 years old’
(2014: 170).
Yet there are also consistent voices that disagree with the diagnosis of a disaﬀected,
ironic youth, both in the US and in Russia (Rutten 2016). ‘New Sincerity’ is regularly
argued to have superseded ‘The Age of Irony’ (Fitzgerald 2012), perhaps most insistently
so after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In Russia, too, ‘New Sincerity’ refers to both an artistic
movement as well as a more general stance currently thriving in many realms but
especially on the Internet in more personalised formats such as blogs (Rutten 2016).
However, this phenomenon is most likely neither a successor nor a predecessor to
irony or cynical ideology as much as it may at times read like a reaction to them.
Indeed, the fuzzy ‘hipster’ label is in fact just as applicable to the preciousness of New Sin-
cerity and its aesthetic preoccupations and it, too, thrives on the Internet. This is to say
that the purported seriousness of the hipster does not necessarily oﬀer a greater public
engagement and its concern with emotions, on the contrary, seems to signal a withdrawal
into private life at the same time as any form of external engagement takes place through
online petitions and responses to calls for donations to charitable initiatives rather than
participation in any form of protest or activism.
The fears and anxieties projected onto millennials and their hipster brethren have
become so acute that they have metamorphosed into doubts surrounding the eﬃcacy of
‘clicktivism’ and whether social media activism can translate into ‘real’ (vs. virtual) politi-
cal mobilisation (Dean 2005; Gladwell 2010; Morozov 2009) . According to critics of this
kind of political engagement, the medium’s eﬀects amplify an already-prevalent cynicism
to such a degree that one arrives at total political passivity (White 2010). Simultaneously,
social media are also at the centre of discussions around millennials’ supposed constant
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need for distraction in an updated version of Neil Postman’s 1986 Amusing Ourselves to
Death – with humour, especially in the form of memes going ‘viral’, operating as a kind of
lingua franca that enables those most skilful at tapping into this register to become most
visible and thus most powerful. In her analysis following the 2016 presidential elections in
the United States, journalist and critic Emily Nussbaum goes so far as to argue that ‘we
memed a President into existence’ (Nussbaum 2017).
While not dismissing these insights, this article argues that a more productive turn to
political humour can be ﬁgured if one does not hope to ﬁnd in it a possible trigger of social
change, or even of a change in attitudes. After all: ‘empirical evidence on the eﬀects of pol-
itical satire consumption indicates that this media activity is decidedly neutral in terms of
normative value’ (Lance Holbert 2013: 311). Instead, ‘jokes provide insights into how
societies work – they are not social thermostats regulating and shaping human behavior,
but they are social thermometers that measure, record and indicate what is going on’
(Davies 1990: 9). For the purposes of this discussion, this means (a) nevertheless taking
political humour seriously and (b) examining it to see what it can tell us about the political
and cultural sensibilities of a speciﬁc time or regime. The next section will examine speciﬁc
manifestations of cynicism in the Russian context, making a distinction between the cyni-
cism of late Soviet Russia and the cynicism of Russia under Putin (Roudakova 2017: 168).
Implicitly, it therefore argues for the importance of making such distinctions in order to
‘treat cynicism as a cultural practice that might have some universal features and some that
are historically and culturally speciﬁc’ (Roudakova 2013: 3).
From late Soviet to Putin-era cynicism
Russia is often portrayed as steeped in multiple layers of cynicism: post-transition, post-
modern and late-Soviet, each of which has impacted majority political participation in
speciﬁc ways. In the twenty-ﬁrst century’s second decade, cynicism can appear to be
the one type of discourse available to all groups of Russian society. It encompasses
those in government and business as much as those far from the centres of power and
wealth. In 2011, journalist Peter Pomerantsev claimed that, rather than conservative
nationalism or neo-authoritarianism, the Kremlin’s ultimate ideology is one of a cynical
form of postmodernism incarnate in a political project: ‘a world of masks and poses, col-
ourful but empty, with little at its core but power for power’s sake and the accumulation of
vast wealth’ (Pomerantsev 2011). The Russian ‘postmodern’ elite are seen to prefer irony
as its stance and spectacle as its central mode of being. In anthropologist Natalia Rouda-
kova’s taxonomy of post-Soviet cynics, these individuals suﬀer from the ‘cynicism of the
friends of power’, which is displayed through ‘straight-talk jadedness, openly declared
weariness, or tough-minded distrust of ideological proclamations’ (Roudakova 2017:
162). In this reading, the battle for Russia’s future is thus fought out between two opposing
forces, an ‘overarching, triumphant cynicism, hateful cynicism which glories in its own
cynicism and thinks everything is for sale and there’s no values, and an attempt at
some sort of integrity’ (Troitsky et al. 2013).
Sociologist Lev Gudkov also observes that Russians in general have become increasingly
cynical with the hardships of a lengthy transition and its failed promises (Gudkov 2013).
The immediate post-Soviet period with its numerous upheavals and deprivations is seen to
have led to mass depoliticisation, that is, a deep mistrust of political involvement. Rather
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than resulting in a desire to exit this condition, he sees cynicism as being symptomatic of a
stagnant society. Thus, while ‘cynicism indicates the erosion of traditional value systems,
the destruction of former beliefs and norms, the beginnings of deep socio-cultural changes
in society’ (Gudkov 2013), it cannot be regarded as heralding institutional or societal
transformations. Instead it makes subjects more suspicious of any vision of change. In
consequence, the language of political communication came to be perceived as hollow,
as political forces from the Left to the Right, in the words of philosopher and activist
Maria Chehonadskih, ‘became formal operators without meaning’ (Chehonadskih 2014:
201). It is in this sense that post-Soviet Russia can also be seen to have arrived at a post-
modernist relativism which sees any political language as pure ideological jargon (Cheho-
nadskih 2014).
Russian cynicism as a cultural practice which has helped to consolidate authoritarian
forms of governance (Roudakova 2017: 159) is preceded by a cynicism which has its
origin in the late Soviet period – and which paradoxically appeared in response to the pol-
itical discourse of its time. Alexey Yurchak describes how, for the last generation to have
been born in the Soviet Union, socialism itself had become immutable, a kind of monolith
serving as a backdrop on which a degree of freedom of expression could be achieved
(Yurchak 1997, 2006). This was made possible through a type of non-participation in
oﬃcial communist events – beyond one’s physical presence – and the staging of a ‘parallel
event’ accompanying it. Socialist ideology had achieved ‘hegemony of representation’
through its omnipresence, that is, the almost complete absence of discourses that would
contest the oﬃcial narrative. However, he insists that just because this seemingly
endless stream of representations of the same political messages was tolerated by most citi-
zens, one should not necessarily interpret this as a sign of any actual belief in their content.
On the contrary, it merely seemed that ‘no other public representation of reality within the
oﬃcial sphere could occur’ (Yurchak 1997: 166). This uniquely coherent oﬃcial sphere of
representation tolerated no true resistance but, equally and paradoxically, it also tolerated
no true recognition. Both political activists and dissidents were regarded by many with
suspicion. After all, they insisted on engaging seriously with an ideology which was
surely so meaningless, yet so foundational to reality that this would equate questioning
its very nature. The solution was in eﬀect a kind of ‘pretense misrecognition’ – a going-
through-the-motions while simultaneously, and in private, exposing the regime to ridicule
through jokes, or anekdoty, whose production and private dissemination grew exponen-
tially in the 1970s and 1980s. This is ‘cynical ideology’ in the extreme: not only does
the engagement in ideological practices largely replace the belief in them, it eﬀectively
makes such belief redundant (Žižek 1989).
Political humour from perestroika to Trump
Satire is militant irony, where moral norms are relatively clear, and standards are assumed
against which the grotesque and absurd are measured – Northrop Frye (1957/2000: 223)
By the early 1980s, the political organisation of the Soviet Union had come to be seen by
many of its citizens as both immutable and essentially empty. In one reading, jokes or
anekdoty thereby operated as a kind of ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990), a type of resistance
that granted subjects a sense of not having been co-opted entirely by the regime. However,
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such an abyss between public and private discourse could also be interpreted as having
created a certain amount of psychic tension. In a Freudian vein, Yurchak credits the
joke-work people engaged in so rampantly as having been able to release or resolve
some of this tension, while at the same time ‘helping to sustain pretense misrecognition
of the incongruous and to maintain concurrent ofﬁcial and parallel spheres’ (Yurchak
1997: 183). This echoes aspects of Serguei Oushakine’s critique of Soviet humour,
where he insists that rather than offering a resolution to systemic oppression, these
jokes ‘provided an impromptu manual, a curious cultural guidebook to pitfalls and idio-
syncrasies of socialism’ (Oushakine 2011: 655). In other words, they enabled a kind of
begrudging coexistence while, at the same time, frequently highlighting not so much sys-
temic failures as personal lapses, because ‘[t]he system’s failures never seemed to be sys-
temic enough and had to be publically reframed and re-dressed as imperfections or
mistakes of concrete individuals and groups’ (Oushakine 2011: 656). This is perhaps
best illustrated through an example:
On the occasion of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, a meeting of
Party members is held in a village. The Chairman of the local Soviet gives a speech, ‘Dear
comrades! Let’s look at the amazing achievements of our Party after the revolution. For
example, here sits Maria. Who was she before? An illiterate peasant woman, she had but
one dress and no shoes. And now? She is an exemplary milkmaid known over the entire
region. Or look at Ivan Andreev. He was the poorest man in this village, had no horse, no
cow, and even no axe. And now? He is a tractor driver, and has two pairs of shoes! Or
look at Troﬁm Semenovich Alekseev. He was a nasty hooligan, a lowest drunkard, a dirty
gadabout. Nobody trusted him even with a snowdrift in wintertime, as he would steal any-
thing his gaze fell upon. And now he’s a Secretary of the Party Committee!1
Here, socialism is credited with providing individuals with new opportunities to transform
their previous circumstances, but depressingly (or hilariously), it is the most indolent and
corrupt persons who end up beneﬁtting the most. The blame is thus to be allocated not
only to such a system, but even more so to the individuals who take advantage of these
shortcomings. Natalia Roudakova insists that the distinction between this humour and
the cynical humour of post-soviet Russia is that the former betrays a belief in the essential
meaningfulness of the Soviet project, even if it faltered in much of its execution, while the
latter is marked by an overabundance of cynical reason following the loss of a ‘world in
common’ between subjects (Roudakova 2017).
Returning to the question of political humour’s role, rather than paving the way for its
disintegration, anekdoty were most likely a response to the Soviet Union’s tensions and
conﬂicts. While the Soviet Union was oﬃcially in existence until the end of 1991, this
seems mostly to have been the result of institutional inertia. Besides more pressing struc-
tural and economic issues, there is only so much disidentiﬁcation an ideological ediﬁce can
sustain, as it will gradually hollow it out from the core. This is how, in reference to Hegel,
Žižek deﬁnes the ‘silent weaving of the spirit’ or the underground disintegration of the
spiritual substance of a community (Žižek 1993), which is eventually followed by its
public collapse.
1Taken from web collection of 100 Russian (chieﬂy Soviet-era) jokes, Last accessed 12.02.2018, http://www.johndclare.net/
Russ12_Jokes.htm
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The late Soviet period of perestroika did in fact produce its very own genre of political
parody – stiob. In short, stiob’s humour is characterised by an adherence to the form of
normalised or hegemonic discourse while, by taking it to its extreme, simultaneously
revealing the premise’s utter absurdity. One of the most memorable examples of stiob is
the promulgation of the theory that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was a mushroom.2 In 1991,
musician Sergey Kuryokhin went on the TV programme The Fifth Wheel (Пятое
колесо) to expound his theory that, as Lenin and his revolutionary comrades had been
great lovers and consumers of wild mushrooms, including hallucinogenic ones, their per-
sonalities had gradually become displaced by the personality of a mushroom. His segment
featured interviews with mycologists and botanists, and concluded with Kuryokhin’s
famous claim:
I have absolutely irrefutable evidence that the October Revolution was carried out by people
who for many years had been consuming certain mushrooms. And in the process of being
consumed by these people, the mushrooms displaced their personality. These people were
turning into mushrooms. In other words, I simply want to say that Lenin was a mushroom.
While it would not be true to say that a majority of people hearing this subscribed to this
theory wholesale, a sufﬁciently high percentage of the public found itself confused as to the
seriousness of the message for the Leningrad Committee of the Communist Party to
release an ofﬁcial statement in response to inquiries about the truth of the claims, insisting
that these were false as ‘a mammal cannot be a plant’. Naturally, their engagement with
these claims only served to expose them to further ridicule.
Even though the relaxed censorship regime of perestroika may have provided the con-
ditions for the dissemination of such theories, it indirectly also enabled the further public
undermining of political discourse. The highly formalised language of socialist states had
led to the forms of estrangement described earlier, described by Yurchak as a ‘performative
shift’ or turn away from literal or semantic meaning and toward performative meaning.
Further similarities between the late Soviet Union and the period of mature neoliberalism
in the West emerge here. In their 2010 article, Dominic Boyer and Alexey Yurchak high-
light how some of the ‘ironic modalities’ of late socialism are becoming increasingly preva-
lent in other places, such as the United States. Indeed, the common binary of (post- or still-
socialist) East and capitalist West, corresponding to First and former ‘Second’ World, is
not only geographically imprecise, it also easily leads one to overlook tendencies that
transcend these (partially imagined but constitutive) diﬀerences.
While late capitalism may, for a time, have managed to withstand a degree of scrutiny
due to the manner in which it has ideologically aligned itself with democratic forms of gov-
ernment, it can be argued that parts of the West have undergone a similar process of
hypernormalisation. In his eponymous 2016 work, ﬁlm maker Adam Curtis claims that
this is a process that has led to political reality becoming deliberately opaque, obscuring
the true locus of power, all thanks to a process of careful manipulation which leaves sub-
jects bewildered and confused amidst an abundant yet overly similar mediascape (Curtis
2016). However, as alluded to earlier, prevalent modes of political discourse also produce
their own genres of satire, speciﬁc instantiations of which are discussed in the next section.
2‘Lenin was a Mushroom’, Wikipedia entry, Last accessed 12.02.2018, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenin_was_a_mushroom
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Hypernormalisation and American stiob
According to Jon Stewart, creator and former host of the Daily Show, a central function in
much US news media has shifted from informing the public to performing what he calls
scripted ‘political theatre’, displaying a similar tendency towards overformalisation and
employment of empty rhetoric. A satirical response to this tendency of hypernormalisa-
tion of certain forms of discourse is a type of ‘American stiob’, exempliﬁed in publications
such as The Onion and McSweeney’s, TV programmes such as The Daily Show and
Stephen Colbert’s Colbert Report, which ended its nine-year run in 2014, as well as char-
acters such as Borat, who demonstrated how the exaggerated depiction of the post-Soviet,
oriental Other can be turned against those most invested in its proliferation (Condee
2008). Like Soviet stiob, here the utmost importance is placed on remaining in character
in order to evidence total identiﬁcation with the discourse that is being parodied. The aim
of this kind of critical intervention is to break the frame of perception and to reveal the
hollowness of the form by showing its disjuncture with the message, especially as it
becomes almost impossible to critique a discourse with the very discursive tools it pro-
vides, ‘to get critical traction on the discursive formalisation that is part of political exper-
tise itself’ (Boyer and Yurchak 2010: 212). Indeed, this is where Yurchak locates the
diﬀerence between the kind of cynical reason, or ‘going through the motions’, that charac-
terises so much of contemporary Western life, according to Sloterdijk, and stiob’s ironic
performance of an overidentiﬁcation with ideology.
However, while the hopeful may retain faith in the possibility that this performative
shift will eventually reveal the hollowness of oﬃcial discourse and thereby represent the
beginning of substantial change, another outcome is that the public can happily move
from laughing about the exploits of politicians, can indeed turn to these shows as a
form of release while simultaneously and passively continuing to vote for these same poli-
ticians due to the lack of any visible alternative – if they vote at all. The famous Žižekian
example of canned laughter which expresses amusement on the viewer’s behalf, allowing a
passive consumption of enjoyment, could be applied to this situation in which the parodic
deconstructions of stiob enable the audience to experience transgressive enjoyment
without any need for a more active response. With the election of Donald Trump,
more and more criticisms regarding the detrimental eﬀects of this kind of ‘interpassivity’
(Pfaller 2017) have been laid at the feet of comedians. As alluded to in the introduction, the
crux of this critique tends to be that satire, especially parody or impersonations in their
most toothless guise, in fact enable a further depoliticisation of the political ﬁeld by focus-
ing on low-hanging fruit such as the US President’s more irksome mannerisms or his
appearance. Some critics, such as writer Jonathan Coe, even go so far as to blame contem-
porary political humour for disincentivising active resistance:
It creates a welcoming space in which like-minded people can gather together and share in
comfortable hilarity. The anger, the feelings of injustice they might have been suﬀering
beforehand are gathered together, compressed and transformed into bursts of laughter,
and after discharging them they feel content and satisﬁed. (Coe in Bremner et al. 2010)
At the same time, the ubiquitous availability of ironic humour means it has also made its
way into the repertoire of conservatives and those even further to the right of the political
spectrum. Hence, if satire is potentially becoming less powerful as a tool of dissent, or has
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even become an integral part of the right’s communications arsenal, their opponents must
now ask themselves the question posed by Nussbaum: ‘How do you ﬁght an enemy who’s
just kidding?’ (2017).
Hyperreal politics, hyperreal resistance
With the increasing impression that ‘it’s all a show anyway’, it becomes harder not only to
subvert the forms political discourse takes, but also to know how and where to apply the
levers. Contemporary life appears to be marked by a blurring of boundaries between the
factual and the ﬁctional. In this age of ‘hyperrealism’, the public is continuously assailed by
a ﬂood of images so all-encompassing that, according to Baudrillard, it becomes diﬃcult
for social actors to distinguish between ‘concrete’ reality and the hyperreality of the image
(Baudrillard 1988). More importantly for the concerns of this discussion, some observers
argue that what has become especially apparent since the 2016 US presidential election
campaign is that this blurring of boundaries also aﬀects the distinction between reality
and satire. For many, the increasing overlap between ﬁction and reality, event and
pseudo-event and truth and post-truth has reached its culmination in the election of a pre-
sident who was previously a successful reality TV star, and who now seemingly employs
those same techniques that made him successful in his political persona. As anthropologist
Janine Wedel observed about American politics and political discourse in 2009: ‘The idea
of reality is being performed, but the reality of reality is more diﬃcult to track and often
undermined’ (Wedel 2009: 81). This is perhaps the motivation for the hostility expressed
by some journalists in response to Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart’s attempts to leave the
conﬁnes of entertainment and cross over into politics, one noteable example here being
Stephen Colbert’s establishment of his own Super PAC in 2011 (Day 2013). And while
some demand of satirists to stay in their lane and not blur the boundaries too much,
others criticise the very same satirists for their lack of eﬃcacy, implying there is more
they could do, or to do it diﬀerently.
The bleeding of one realm into another as concurrent with hypernormalisation is some-
thing that can also be observed in contemporary Russia whose government, according to
critic Gleb Napreenko, ‘does not appeal to any of the dimensions of truth, neither its uni-
versality nor its subjective intimacy. Instead, it operates in the horizonless register of illu-
sions’ (Napreenko 2014, italics in original). While one way in which this is evident is the
many guises of President Putin’s persona (Brock 2016), another illustration of a situation
in which it is increasingly diﬃcult to distinguish between parody and political reality is the
continued political success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal
Democratic Party, is the paradigmatic cynical politician, acting as Putin’s buﬀoonish
alter ego regularly engaging in obscene or xenophobic speech. This unthinkable alternative
to Putin draws ‘the votes of cynics, whose sole motive was to reduce to absurdity the sen-
seless and boring parliamentary debates’ (Budraitskis 2014: 181). Thus, for example, in the
midst of the Crimean crisis he called for the abolition of the letter ы from the Cyrillic
alphabet, as, he claimed, ‘this is why they don’t like us in Europe’,3 implying that diﬃcul-
ties of pronounciation are of greater concern than a geopolitical crisis involving the
annexation of foreign territory.
3Polit.ru, ‘Zhirinovsky called for letter “ы” to become illegal’, polit.ru, 12.03.2014, Last accessed 12.02.2018, http://polit.ru/
news/2014/03/12/alphabet/
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For those treating the Russian public sphere as a world of masks and poses, a simula-
crum with nothing at its core, there is little to no hope that this cynical relation to politics
can lead to political transformation. Yet this simpliﬁed picture of a mass withdrawal from
the public sphere needs to be problematised. The persistent telling of political jokes in the
Soviet Union was also evidence of a potential for resistance, in the sense of citizens trying
to carve out a space of dissent, albeit privately – a case of critical as well as cynical distance.
As discussed earlier, such jokes also hint at the fact that this space is needed in order to
reaﬃrm a belief in societal, collective undertakings. The mass demonstrations which
took place in Russia’s largest cities – as well as surges of smaller-scale protests and
strikes throughout the 1990s (Robertson 2010) – after parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions in 2011 and 2012 respectively and, more recently, in the spring of 2017, demonstrate
a persistent dissatisfaction with the political ﬁeld rather than a culture of total non-engage-
ment (Budraitskis 2014).
Such seemingly contradictory tendencies of cynical passivity against a backdrop of
political theatre on the one hand and public protest on the other, prove not only that
social change is frequently hard to predict – indeed, leading scholars failed to predict
the end of the Soviet Union (Cox 2009), which equally seemed to take the majority of
its citizens by surprise (Yurchak 2006). More importantly, it should alert scholars to
the potentialities of a state in which signiﬁcant segments of the population appear to
be at best harbouring ambivalent sentiments towards an existing regime, which can
translate into large-scale resistance after long periods of seeming disengagement. This
is especially true of so-called ‘hybrid regimes’ which, according to Graeme Robertson,
are particularly vulnerable to pressure from street protests: ‘Whereas it takes large
numbers of oppositionists to create problems in elections, relatively small numbers of
protesters can generate great embarrassment for the authorities and create a real political
problem’ (Robertson 2010: 186).
At the same time, the seeming contradiction between the large demonstrations in
Russia in the 2010s and, in the space of a few years, the protest movement’s virtual dis-
appearance in the face of presidential approval ratings climbing up to a high of 89 per
cent in June 20154 following the prolonged conﬂict with former ‘brother-nation’
Ukraine, may in fact be not only the result of increased pressure from the government
through arrests and ever-more restrictive laws. The cynicism that has shaped so much of
the Russian people’s relationship to politics may have helped to ‘create an illusion of
critical political agency, mitigating rather than amplifying protest dynamics, and
thereby reaﬃrming rather than unsettling existing power relations’ (Roudakova 2013:
7). In Roudakova’s view, internal divisions among protesters were magniﬁed as they
subscribed to the cynical belief that each side was being ‘conned’ by the government.
This meant that the movement ended up being critically devoid of the kind of
uniﬁed front needed to gain traction in such an increasingly repressive political
environment, to further translate political dissatisfaction into concrete political
demands, while, at the same time, for large swathes of the population an antagonistic
nationalism oﬀered an escape from a political ﬁeld dominated by cynicism or recurrent
disappointments.
4According to poll conducted by Levada-Center: http://www.levada.ru/eng/
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Citizens failing to revolt
Rather than coming full circle in this social diagnosis and concluding that cynicism can
never serve as a force towards progress, one may still make the case that at the heart of
some forms of cynicism and irony rests a moral core. Viewed from this angle, cynicism
can become a tool to ‘create the necessary distance between political subjects and oppres-
sive circumstances – distance from which an agentive consciousness of resistance can take
root’ (Roudakova 2013: 7). ‘Cynical distance’ here represents a ﬁrst step towards greater
participation in the public sphere, rather than an increased withdrawal from it. In fact,
both irony and cynicism can originate not so much in an inability or unwillingness to
engage seriously with the world, but in a continued disappointment in ‘the disgrace of
how the world is, how we ourselves are, and how we might like things to be’ (Bustillos
2012).
What has been perceived as a tendency towards ‘narcissistic withdrawal’ (Oushakine
2000: 1011) in Russians and the post-socialist world more generally (and that, crucially,
applies to millenials as well) can then be reframed in some circumstances. In a more
nuanced analysis of the so-called ‘apathy’ or political disengagement of post-socialist
societies, these attitudes can in fact be said to represent a form of resistance to Western
ideas of democratic progress and the normative ideas this entails. In addition, as anthro-
pologist Jessica Greenberg has argued, framing nonparticipation as failure could be doubly
problematic, as in certain readings it serves to produce ‘failed subjects’, thereby orientalis-
ing post-socialist subjects further: ‘This language of alienation, disaﬀection, and retreat
implies that apathy is a withdrawal from not only failed state institutions and compro-
mised political processes but a cultural-psychological state produced by political-social
contexts’ (Greenberg 2010: 61).
Instead, nonparticipation can be seen as a response to changing socio-political contexts
and the way that, in the post-socialist world (though not only), the domain of politics is
often seen as corrupted or contaminated, as the disappointments and hardships experi-
enced after transition meet the ‘cynical distance’ of (post)modernity.
While nonparticipation can be regarded as a key symptom of cynicism and acquies-
cence to the status quo, Greenberg insists that it can also be regarded as an ethical
choice or attempt to remain a ‘a moral subject’ (Greenberg 2010: 63), a way of escaping
‘the corrupting sphere of politics’ (63), which is seen to be inhabited by the ‘rich, criminal
and corrupt’ (56).
Returning to irony and the US, Richard Rorty defends this structure of feeling in a not
dissimilar manner by emphasising its ethical nature, so that it becomes not a lack of ser-
iousness or sincerity per se but, rather, a refusal to subscribe to one metaphysical con-
ception of the world over another. While the ironist may have radical doubts based on
the contingency of any moral or philosophical framework, Rorty insists that this hesitance
to adopt any one framework is not incompatible with liberalism and opposition to forms
of cruelty wherever they may occur. Irony’s emphasis on self-fashioning places the onus
on the individual to deﬁne such a stance in the absence of any guiding moral philosophy.
At the same time, ironists are:
[…] never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in
which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency
and fragility of their ﬁnal vocabularies, and thus of their selves. (Rorty 1989: 73)
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In the ﬁnal analysis, however, Rorty claims that an overwhelming sense of irony is unli-
kely to spell the end of community – the example Rorty raises is that of the decline of
religious faith, which has not led to the feared disintegration of liberal societies. Thus,
while an ironic stance provides few of the assurances of other moral frameworks, it
offers a new kind of historic sensibility. At the same time, this notion of irony as a
non-destructive force – and, further along on this continuum, cynicism as a conservative
societal mechanism – does not contradict the criticisms of non-engagement with which
this discussion began. In fact, one may be able to discern in some instantiations of irony
and cynicism a deep concern with how to take up an ethical stance, but one that may
prove paralysing.
Who can (aﬀord to) laugh?
It has in recent times become clear that claims of a complete lack of political engagement
among ‘millennials’ need to be revised in the face of the large-scale mobilisation of the
Occupy movement, a more recently reignited protest culture following the election of
Donald Trump to oﬃce, as well as the recent popularity of politicians such as Jeremy
Corbyn in the UK or Bernie Sanders in the US. And while the Occupy movement has
been criticised for its lack of leadership or failure to translate the protests into concrete
political demands (Gamson and Sifry 2013), this maximal openness and commitment
to a non-partisan politics of democracy managed to attract great swathes of those
suﬀering from a disenchantment with traditional politics referred to above. The so-
called ‘Movement of the Squares’ (Gerbaudo 2017) was global in nature, referring to
local protests in capital cities with simultaneous transnational links in countries as dispa-
rate as the US, Turkey and Russia. Crucially, these protests were largely driven by those
selfsame allegedly disengaged young people. The ‘multiple temporalities’ that Michael
Hardt speaks of in reference to these protests (Hardt 2017) thus also points to a more
global convergence of political climates – as seen already herein in relation to Russia
and the United States.
However, the Occupy movement’s dissolution may yet serve to increase this ‘cynical
distance’ to participatory democracy. At the same time, more recent large-scale protests
in the US in response to Donald Trump’s policies threatening women’s reproductive
rights, or his stance on climate change and scientiﬁc evidence more generally, have
already attracted negative scrutiny, be it for being too broad or for investing too many
resources in the crafting of life-size caricatures and witty puns rather than in the creation
of a uniﬁed platform for political action (Garber 2017).
Indeed, the recent oversaturation of political satire produced online (Crittenden et al.
2011) and the seeming ‘parody fatigue’ it has resulted in has led to very postmodern
responses: articles that mock the idea that a well crafted joke could topple the President
(e.g., Loveness 2017), as well as the launch of a sister website of The Onion which now
produces meta-satire, or satire of the political satire that supposedly considered itself
capable of triggering regime change.5 This impatience with the kind of protest that is
being engaged in demonstrates once more the recurrent sense that satire’s potential
eﬃcacy has not been properly deployed – paradoxically, often by creators of satire
5www.resistancehole.clickhole.com
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themselves, with the blame apportioned to both creators and an audience deemed too apa-
thetic, too cynical or too distracted by easy jokes.
Yet the phenomenon of activism, like that of political humour, is not monolithic. Satire
and humour have always been important elements of societal critique and political protest,
but they can only ever represent a subset of the ‘activisms’ that seek to instigate change. It
is important to acknowledge that this article does not do justice to the mobilisation – both
‘on the ground’ and in digital spaces – that has taken place under the banner of some
recent instantiations of protest culture such as #blacklivesmatter, #sayhername and
#metoo. These movements are an illustration of how the online sphere can also be a
space of solidarity and accountability, demonstrating how digital activism needs to be con-
sidered in a situated, context-speciﬁc manner, rather than from a deterministic and media-
centric angle (Kaun and Uldam 2018). However, one important distinction from the focus
of this article is that movements like Black Lives Matter and Me Too have functioned
largely without recourse to humour. While the fact that they were created in response
to racist and gender violence and thus brought about by very palpable pain may be part
of the explanation for this, it could also point to certain forms of political humour
being a white, elitist – and frequently male – prerogative. Indeed, when the feminist move-
ment (itself frequently dominated by white, middle-class, cis women) does engage in
forms of ‘memeﬁcation’ or ‘pop feminism’, thereby enabling its ideas to be widely
shared, it is often accused of distilling and simplifying ideas, thus having to grapple
with the ever looming specter of trivialisation and of ignoring or brushing oﬀ problematic
racialised dynamics (Baer 2016).
Nonetheless, humour is not antithetical to tackling painful issues. Theresa O’Keefe
(2014) argues that irony and mockery are in fact crucial tools of resistance and subversion.
In her critique of the tactics of activist group FEMEN and the SlutWalk-movement she
clariﬁes that their ‘failure to inject mockery and irony into their approach means it is com-
monly read as repetitive of such norms rather than subversive’ (O’Keefe 2014: 11). In other
words, the tactics of stiob have a place in activism as well, if well deployed and commu-
nicated, by going beyond reproducing norms in acts of ‘blank parody’ (O’Keefe 2014: 7).
Marxist theorist Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi applauds such an ironic use of protest in his
appraisal of Argentinian art collective Erroristas of Grupo Etcetera who, in their perform-
ances and actions, ‘promote the idea of “Errorism” [as] an artistic response to the destruc-
tion of civil rights that has accompanied the War On Terror which they say is as much
about “errors” as it is “terrorism”’.6 In Berardi’s reading, their symbolic actions ‘are
suﬃcient to produce a deconstructive eﬀect over power’s unanimous conformity’ (Clina-
men 2018). For Berardi, the only way to break through the cynicism is in fact to transcend
the limits of language. However, it remains to be seen whether this hailing of political art
and actionism simply transfers the fundamental issue from the realm of satire to that of
art. What is more, while artists can be accused of a diﬀerent kind of elitism or obscurant-
ism, some are taking their performance into the open, to sites where art merges with
protest, at times to confront the state or authorities directly. Rather than seeing satire
as replacing more eﬀective forms of protest, then, experience has shown the two to be
in a close and symbiotic relationship, as what unites both political art and political
humour is the importance placed on breaking frames of perception.
6‘The Erroristas of Etcetera’, http://www.wecreatetogether.net/2013/02/27/the-erroristas-of-etcetera/
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Such playing with symbols, so at odds with politicians’ habitual discourse, is reminis-
cent of Peter Sloterdijk’s description of the kynic who rejects oﬃcial culture and ideology
by confronting them with irony and sarcasm (Sloterdijk 1987). Returning to Russia, it has
similarly been argued that ‘cynicism can only be stemmed by kynicism, not by morality.
Only a joyful kynicism of ends is never tempted to forget that life has nothing to lose
except itself’ (Lipovetsky 2013). Russia has a long history of kynics resisting state cynicism
through humorous refusals to play by the rules, including ﬁctional characters such Ostap
Bender of Ilf and Petrov’s Twelve Chairs and Venichka of Erofeev’s Moskva-Petushki, as
well as underground artist Dmitry Prigov and, more recently, the women of Pussy Riot.
Speaking of the mass protests in Russia in 2011 and 2012, Natalia Roudakova expresses
hope in the return of ‘parrhesia’ in the Foucauldian sense. Indeed, she sees irony as the
prevalent register in which to ‘speak truth to power’, as the cynical discourses of post-
Soviet Russia, followed by the aggressive nationalism of the last few years, have created
a marked fear of pathos in the arena of political communication (Roudakova 2017).
Conclusion
This article has identiﬁed political modalities in Russia and the US (and, arguably, beyond)
that converge along certain fault lines. These include an overabundant yet similar media
environment – a tendency that the 24-hour news cycle and digitial platforms have only
served to enhance, combined with a lack of trust in what is being presented in that
environment, a perceived shortage of credibility of established politics, a tendency to
blur the distinction between – or even merging of – politics and spectacle, culminating
in the impression of having reached a ‘hyperreal’ state where the borders between truth
and ﬁction have become porous or entirely absent, and a disenchantment with traditional
politics, leading to both cynicism as well as a protest culture that shares some political
tactics and aesthetics across geographical borders.
Ultimately, this analysis necessarily leads us to the question of where this leaves satire,
and whether it can intervene at critical junctures by drawing attention to injustices and
inconsistencies committed by those in power. Previously, this article outlined the existing
argument that there is nothing inherently transformative about satire in the twenty-ﬁrst
century because ideology has co-opted satire, meaning that citizens can ‘consume’
outrage passively through various satirical media products. By displacing this outrage
they can thus abstain from more active forms of resistance. More recent scholarship
has suggested that the ubiquitous presence of humorous memes and satirical forms of
expression has weakened impact of satire even further. However, the question posed
herein is whether there was ever a belief in satire’s ability to eﬀect any change at all, or
whether one retroactively imputes this belief to previous generations and then ends up
condemning them for not realising its full potential. In actual fact, it may be naïve to
assume that political satirists ever saw it within their power to topple regimes, especially
when working in a top-down medium such as television (Basu 2015).
The discussion above established early on that what is at stake is not to prove the
eﬃcacy of satire in triggering change, but to illustrate how it can nevertheless have a
diﬀerent political eﬀect. In Russia, against a backdrop of multiple layers of cynicism, pol-
itical humour has reaﬃrmed its role both in the present and the past. Humour served and
served as a coping mechanism: in conditions of censorship, for example, it enabled citizens
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to create and reaﬃrm a sense of personal distance and to carve out a place from which to
articulate political critique. Stiob, the distinct genre of satire which emerged during late
socialism and which mocks existing discursive traditions by reproducing them, and eﬀec-
tively over-performing an ideology that seemed as monolithic as reality itself, is one
example of how hegemonic regimes aﬀect the form political humour assumes. But with
the increased prevalence of this type of humour being incorporated in formats that seek
to oﬀer political critique – notably in the US in shows such as The Colbert Report and
The Daily Show and publications such as The Onion, together with new sites of
humour production and via dissemination on the Internet – the increased visibility of pol-
itical humour and a seemingly immutable ideological landscape have been read as having a
correlative or even causal relationship, rather than as merely coinciding. However, it has
been shown that there is no clear connection with irony and satire consumed ‘interpas-
sively’, and action or inaction in other forms of public life, despite a seemingly decreasing
faith in established politics. In fact, many commentators are still smarting from the per-
ceived failure of the Occupy movement, leading to another form of conﬂation, namely
from the idea of satire leading to increased passivity and ‘cynical distance’ in subjects,
to its utilisation in forms of protest as making the latter ineﬀectual and mere empty ges-
tures. This article has instead argued for treating political humour as a legimate form of
political communciation, which is consumed like other forms of communication, while
also oﬀering additional, original forms of critique.
Least constructive of all may be to expose political humour to the same cynical attitude
that has subsumed so much of public life. Instead, it may be useful to distinguish between
diﬀerent modes of cynicism. Besides the cynicism of those in power and the passive and
self-indulgent cynicism of the powerless, which is nevertheless marked by an attitude of
disdain, there is a cynicism of despair. Similarly, when speaking of irony, one should
diﬀerentiate between the poseur and the self-conscious ironist. Indeed, in some interpret-
ations irony can become a form of humility, demonstrating ‘that we know we are not the
center of the universe […] That we can ﬁnd humor in the contrast between our natural
self-centeredness and our likely inconsequentiality, at any given moment’ (Bustillos
2012). Signiﬁcantly, these modes can persist in the same subject, activated under
diﬀerent circumstances.
However, as this article has highlighted, ironic and cynical forms of humour can be
fuelled by a common disenchantment with traditional politics, while simultaneously
asking what it is to be an ethical, political subject. A major distinction between the two is
the way irony harbours a hope and belief in the possibility of joy (Berardi 2015), whereas
cynicism does not. Indeed, the former can produce the kind of joy that can spill over and
promote collective action (Segal 2017). However, far more dangerous than cynicism is the
kind of nihilism which emerges at a time when the public sphere is treated as an illusion,
truth seen as more slippery than ever and political allegiance a mere consequence of
being trapped in the same ‘ﬁlter bubble’. Satire, on the other hand, can inject an optimism
into despair which may serve to reinvigorate the political arena.
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